## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECF5040

2022年9月22日

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## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Summary and discussion of experimental evidence

In this chapter we analysed the possible anticompetitive effects of some business practices that may enable firms to coordinate price increases and to resist the temptation to discount. We did not consider transactions efficiencies that may arise from the use of these practices. Our focus has been on coordination that is tacit, not overt, and therefore on whether the combination of practices we consider would arise in a market environment in which supracompetitive prices can be sustained even if firms would discount were such price-cutting perceived to be unilaterally profitable.
We show that public advance notification of list-price increases and the use of bestprice policies can result in supracompetitive equilibrium list and transactions prices that are immune to discounting. Furthermore, there is a range of firms’ sales quantities at common list prices above the competitive level for which small unilateral discounts are unprofitable if such discounts can only be given non-selectively to all buyers. If costs are symmetric and firms attain equal shares of contract sales at the common list price, then the range of common list prices impervious to discounting contains all prices up to the ‘Cournot price’, which would result in a Cournot equilibrium with output quantities being selected non-cooperatively.

If firms can give selective discounts (i.e., discounts offered to only a subset of a competitor’s customers), then we show that the use of best-price clauses does not result in supracompetitive list prices that are immune to discounting as long as a firm making an unmatched discount offer obtains more sales than would a competitor who matches the offer. With most-favoured-customer clauses, however, selective discounting is not possible if each buyer purchases some units from each seller, so that buyer behaviour is an important determinant of the level of transactions prices in the presence of best-price clauses. In the Ethyl case, the evidence indicated that virtually all customers made purchases from the two largest producers.

The finding in the symmetric-cost case that list prices between the competitive and Cournot price are impervious to unilateral, non-selective discounting is consistent with the pricing behaviour observed in some experiments conducted by Grether and Plott (1984). In their experiments with advance notification and most-favouredcustomer contracts, announced prices were continuously displayed to all buyers, and all transactions were required to take place at announced prices.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Exclusive territories as a device to reduce competition

We consider here a simple model, borrowed from Rey and Stiglitz (1985), which shows how exclusive territories, which obviously reduce competition at the lower level, may actually be a way of reducing competition also at the upper level. The basic idea is that when retailers enjoy some kind of monopolistic power, they may put higher markups in the retail price: this price distortion, in turn, induces some change to the cross sensitivity of this demand towards the prices of the manufacturers’ competitors. The manufacturers may therefore perceive a less elastic demand than when they directly compete with each other or sell to competitive retailers. This effect in turn may induce both producers to assign exclusive territories to their retailers.
Let us describe this model. There are two manufacturers, each producing a simple good with a constant marginal cost $c_i$ and distributing it via retailers who have no retail costs. The two products are imperfect substitutes. The final demand for good $i$, associated with retail prices $q_1$ and $q_2$, is given by $D_i\left(q_1, q_2\right)$. For simplicity, we assume symmetry: $c_1=c_2$ and $\forall x, y \in \Re_{+}, D_1(x, y)=D_2(y, x)$. Consumers have no search costs and thus buy at the lowest possible price for each product. Lastly, we will suppose in the following that all profit functions are concave, admit a unique – and interior – maximum, and we will thus focus on first-order conditions.

We can define two useful benchmarks, corresponding respectively to perfect collusion and direct competition between producers:
the collusive outcome is defined by the maximization of the aggregate profits $\left(q_1-c\right) D_1\left(q_1, q_2\right)+\left(q_2-c\right) D_2\left(q_1, q_2\right)$, and leads to the monopolistic price $q^m$
$\left(q^m-c\right) / q^m=1 /\left(\varepsilon_1\left(q^m, q^m\right)+\varepsilon_2\left(q^m, q^m\right)\right)$
where $\varepsilon_1$ and $\varepsilon_2$ respectively denote the direct and cross-price elasticities of the final demands $\left(\varepsilon_i=-\partial \log D_1 / \partial \log q_i\right)$. The monopolistic markup is thus the higher, the lower is the sensitivity of the demand for a product with respect to its own price and the higher is the sensitivity of this demand to the price of the other product. ${ }^4$
The outcome associated with direct competition corresponds to the (Nash) equilibrium of the game defined by producer $i$ ‘s strategy $q_i$ and payoff $\left(q_i-c\right) D_i\left(q_1, q_2\right)$. The ‘competitive’ price $q^c$ is characterized (under standard assumptions on payoffs functions) by
$$\left(q^c-c\right) / q^c=1 / \varepsilon_1\left(q^c, q^c\right)$$

# 产业经济学代考

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写工业经济代考|<强>作为减少竞争的设备的专属领土

$\left(q^m-c\right) / q^m=1 /\left(\varepsilon_1\left(q^m, q^m\right)+\varepsilon_2\left(q^m, q^m\right)\right)$
，其中$\varepsilon_1$和$\varepsilon_2$分别表示最终需求的直接和交叉价格弹性$\left(\varepsilon_i=-\partial \log D_1 / \partial \log q_i\right)$。因此，垄断加价越高，一种产品的需求对其自身价格的敏感性就越低，而这种需求对另一种产品价格的敏感性就越高。${ }^4$

$$\left(q^c-c\right) / q^c=1 / \varepsilon_1\left(q^c, q^c\right)$$

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## MATLAB代写

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